When the first cases of monkeypox were reported in Bayelsa State in September 2017, the outbreak quickly spread. However, in the South East and parts of the South South, the official medical response was met with deep-seated fear and suspicion. Rumours spread that the military was secretly injecting schoolchildren with the monkeypox virus under the guise of an immunisation program.
The search intent here is to find the factual context behind this urgent denial. We must examine the paranoia, the actual response by health agencies, and the critical importance of effective risk communication during a public health crisis.
The Birth of a Conspiracy: Fear Meets The Military
The fear that led to the FG’s firm denial was rooted in a confluence of factors unique to Nigeria’s political climate at the time.
A. The Climate of Distrust
The 2017 period was marked by high political and ethnic tension, particularly in the South East, due to the presence of the military conducting Operation Python Dance II. This operation was officially aimed at curbing insecurity, but its deployment coincided with rising separatist agitation.
-
The Rumour Mill: In this tense environment, any official action by the Federal Government—especially one involving injection or medicine—was instantly viewed through a political lens. The rumour started: military personnel were administering a “killer vaccine” disguised as an immunisation against monkeypox.
-
Targeting Schools: The panic peaked when the rumours claimed the vaccination was being administered specifically to schoolchildren. This led to mass withdrawals of children from schools, public demonstrations, and even clashes between citizens and health workers. The panic was driven by the idea that the FG was intentionally spreading the disease, not fighting it.
B. The Urgent Need for Denial
The Federal Government, through agencies like the Nigeria Centre for Disease Control (NCDC), had to intervene immediately. The denial—that the FG was “not conducting any immunisation” for monkeypox in the South East or anywhere else—was necessary to counter the misinformation and protect both the public and the health workers on the ground.
The key fact was simple: in 2017, Nigeria did not have a targeted, mass-vaccination program against monkeypox. The global vaccine (like the JYNNEOS vaccine now available) was not in widespread use, and the primary response was surveillance, isolation, and contact tracing. The denial was technically and medically accurate, but politically charged.
The NCDC’s Real Response to the 2017 Outbreak
While the government was busy denying the vaccination rumours, the real public health response was focused on tried-and-true methods of outbreak containment.
A. Surveillance and Case Management
The NCDC, in collaboration with state ministries of health and international partners like the WHO and US CDC, activated its Emergency Operations Centre (EOC). Their strategy focused on non-pharmaceutical interventions:
-
Case Identification and Isolation: Rapid response teams were deployed to states like Bayelsa, Rivers, and others to confirm suspected cases and ensure patients were isolated to break the human-to-human transmission chain.
-
Contact Tracing: Thorough tracing of all close contacts of confirmed cases was a priority, a fundamental containment step.
-
Laboratory Confirmation: Samples were sent to national and international labs for confirmation of the West African Clade of the monkeypox virus, which is generally milder.
B. Risk Communication: The Failure of Messaging
The entire debacle highlighted a profound failure in Risk Communication. A robust health response is useless if the public does not trust the source.
-
Lack of Prior Education: There was a lack of widespread public education about monkeypox (a disease that had been dormant in Nigeria for nearly 40 years), leaving an information vacuum that rumours quickly filled.
-
Mismanaging the Military: The military’s involvement in any capacity during that tense period, even if well-intentioned, created a fatal intersection of public health and political suspicion. The government failed to adequately separate the public health response from the security operations in the public mind.
Lessons for Future Outbreaks (and Current Ones)
The 2017 monkeypox scare provides vital lessons that remain relevant as Nigeria continues to battle infectious diseases:
-
Transparency is the Only Vaccine Against Fear: Government communication must be proactive, explaining exactly what measures are being taken and why, before rumours take hold.
-
Delineate Roles: Military aid should be used for logistics and security, not for direct public health interaction (like administering injections) during periods of high civilian distrust.
-
Empower Local Authorities: The messaging must be led by known, trusted local and state health officials, rather than solely by the distant Federal Government (FG) in Abuja.
The Enduring Legacy of Monkeypox and Public Mistrust
Monkeypox has since become re-established in Nigeria, leading to the global outbreak that began in 2022. The fact that Nigeria has now received actual mpox vaccines (like JYNNEOS) in 2024 for targeted, high-risk groups shows how the scientific response evolves.
However, the political and social barriers identified in 2017 remain. The denial by the FG was a necessary defensive move to contain a social panic, but it reveals a deeper truth: in Nigeria, public health efforts are often viewed not just through a medical lens, but through the highly charged filter of ethnic distrust and political affiliation. Building effective public health infrastructure requires not just vaccines, but a massive investment in political trust and honest, accessible communication.
